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Abstract. The theory of opposition has always been viewed as the founding prin-
ciple of structuralism within contemporary linguistics and semiotics. As an analy-
tical technique, it has remained a staple within these disciplines, where it conti-
nues to be used as a means for identifying meaningful cues in the physical form of 
signs. However, as a theory of conceptual structure it was largely abandoned 
under the weight of post-structuralism starting in the 1960s — the exception to 
this counter trend being the work of the Tartu School of semiotics. This essay 
revisits opposition theory not only as a viable theory for understanding conceptual 
structure, but also as a powerful technique for establishing the interconnectedness 
of language, culture, and cognition. 
 
Introduction 
 
The founding principle of structuralism in semiotics, linguistics, 
psychology, and anthropology is the theory of opposition. The philo-
sophical blueprint of this principle can be traced back to the concept 
of dualism in the ancient world (Hjelmslev 1939, 1959; Benveniste 
1946). It was implicit in Saussure’s (1916) own principle of différence. 
In the 1930s the Prague School linguists (Trubetzkoy 1936, 1939; 
Jakobson 1939) and several Gestalt psychologists (especially Ogden 
1932) gave the principle its scientific articulation and, in the sub-
sequent decades of the 1940s and 1950s, it was used to carry out exten-
sive analyses of languages and to establish universal patterns in 
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linguistic structure. It was also expanded tentatively in the same era to 
encompass the study of the conceptual structure of language. However, 
by the 1960s, work and debate on such extensions of the theory came 
abruptly to a halt with the advent of two movements — generativism 
in linguistics (Chomsky 1957) and post-structuralism in semiotics 
(Derrida 1967) — both of which caught on broadly within their 
respective disciplines. 
At the start of the 1990s several powerful defenses of opposition 
theory by Andrews (1990; Andrews and Tobin 1996) and Battistella 
(1990, 1996) came forward to revive interest in it. However, the 
crystallization and spread of yet another movement in linguistics, 
known as cognitive linguistics, once again relegated opposition theory 
to the margins of linguistics. However, as will be argued and illustrated 
in this paper, the theory of opposition is hardly antithetical to the basic 
principles of cognitive linguistics. It is actually implicit in its funda-
mental blueprint for language study. My purpose here is to revisit 
opposition theory as theory of language, mind, and culture, extending 
it as well to the domain of cognitive linguistic theory. The theory can, 
moreover, be seen to raise such fundamental semiotic questions as: 
Are human codes interconnected to each other through oppositional 
structure? Does such structure exist in reality or is it projected onto 
reality by the human mind? Is human cognition itself oppositional, as 
reflected in the fact that the brain has two hemispheres that process 
information in a complementary binary fashion? By revisiting the 
theory, and expanding it to encompass new forms of research in both 
semiotics and linguistics, it may be possible to answer such questions 
concretely.  
 
 
Background 
 
As mentioned, the basic idea behind opposition theory is ancient, 
going back to philosophies based on dualism, such as the Chinese 
ying/yang mystical framework and Aristotle’s logical dualism (Ogden 
1932; Babin 1940; Bocheński 1961; Deely 2001; Anfindsen 2006). 
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Dualism found its way into radical Cartesian philosophy in the 
sixteenth century — a philosophy that went so far as to claim that the 
mind and the body were separate entities. But the Cartesian view was 
more of an aberration than a continuation of ancient dualism, which 
actually sought to understand the relation between the body and the 
mind, not their independence. Certainly, the kind of dualism 
envisioned by the early structuralists was not Cartesian in any sense of 
the term, since it actually suggested that words were both sound-based 
and conceptual phenomena and, thus, simultaneously auditory-
acoustic and mental forms. In fact, the implicit philosophical idea in 
early structuralism was that the human mind is inclined by its nature 
to perceive the world in terms of opposites. This is probably due to the 
fact that much of human anatomy is structured in a symmetrical 
binary way — we have a left and right hand, eye, ear, foot, etc. Among 
the first to make this implicit principle a target of empirical investi-
gation were, in fact, the early founders of psychology, such as Wilhelm 
Wundt (1880) and Edward B. Titchener (1910). Their research agenda 
led to the establishment of structuralism in psychology and to its 
theoretical cross-fertilization in semiotics, linguistics, and anthro-
pology. 
Saussure (1916) put forward the notion of différence as being a 
particularly useful one for explaining how we extract meaningful (or 
more exactly meaning-bearing) cues from the chain of speech in 
oppositional terms. His analysis led to the theory of the phoneme as a 
differential unit of sound. Then, in the late 1920s, the Prague School 
(the Prague Linguistic Circle) adopted opposition theory as the basis 
of their approach to the study of language structure (Jakobson et al. 
1928; Jakobson 1932, 1936; Trubetzkoy 1936, 1939, 1968; Pos 1938, 
1964), thus establishing structuralism broadly as the primary modus 
operandi in linguistics and semiotics (Wallon 1945; Parsons, Bales 
1955; Godel 1957; Lévi-Strauss 1958, 1971; Blanché 1966; Chomsky, 
Halle 1968; Belardi 1970; Ivanov 1974; Needham 1973; Fox 1974, 1975; 
Lorrain 1975; Jakobson, Waugh 1979). Indeed, no distinction was 
made between the term ‘structuralism’ and linguistics for several 
decades.  
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The first in-depth theoretical study of opposition as a theory of 
mind was Charles Ogden’s 1932 treatise, Opposition: A Linguistic and 
Psychological Analysis, which elaborated upon several key ideas 
discussed in 1923 by Ogden and Richards in The Meaning of Meaning. 
Ogden claimed that a small set of conceptual oppositions, such as 
right/left and yes/no, appeared to be intrinsically binary in nature and 
that these were found across cultures. Others showed “gradience” 
between the two poles. For example, in an opposition such as 
white/black, various color concepts such as gray, red, etc. could be 
located between the white and black poles, a fact that clearly has both 
referential and conceptual resonance — gradient colors are distributed 
on the light spectrum, while white and black are not, forming instead 
conceptual endpoints on a mental color scale. Similarly, between the 
polar concepts of day and night on the day/night oppositional scale, 
gradient concepts such as twilight, dawn, noon, and afternoon can be 
inserted being, again, both referentially and conceptually appropriate. 
In other words, only “polar concepts”, as they can be called, form a 
binary opposition and have, thus, paradigmatic structure in the 
conceptual system of a language, whereas “gradient concepts” do 
not — one cannot put red into any polar opposition with another 
color. Such concepts are “distributed concepts” on already-existing 
oppositional scales. They show, in other words, syntagmatic structure, 
since they are connected to the polar concepts in referential ways. 
Ogden also distinguished between oppositions that are cross-cultural 
(right/left, day/night) and those, like town/country, that are culture-
specific. This suggests that there may be a “deep level” of oppositional 
structure that is part and parcel of human cognition, and a “surface 
level” that contains oppositions that are forged and acquired in 
specific cultural contexts. In effect, from the outset opposition theory 
was perceived to be a de facto theory of cognition, a theory that 
examined language as a channel through which cognitive structure 
gained physical form.  
The Prague School linguists developed most of the technical 
apparatus of opposition theory by first investigating phonological and 
grammatical systems. And, in fact, the use of opposition theory to 
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study phonological systems was never abandoned by the generative 
movement, remaining a central aspect of its own theoretical apparatus 
to this day, despite some dissension within the movement (Haspel-
math 2006). However, its extension to other levels, especially the 
semantic-conceptual one, was either relegated to the margins, 
resurfacing as componential analysis, or else totally abandoned under 
the weight of an analytic logical approach to meaning. But linguists of 
a different persuasion started revisiting opposition theory more 
broadly in the 1990s. Andrews (1990), for instance, argued that it 
allowed us to detect patterns of universal structure and meaning 
connecting language, mathematics, and other representational systems. 
Battistella (1990, 1996) claimed that it could be enlisted to explain 
several seemingly unrelated processes in linguistic change and that its 
extension to the study of conceptual structure and cultural represen-
tation could provide valuable insights into the relation between 
thought, language, and culture (see also Elšík, Matras 2006). Mel’cuk 
(2001) applied opposition theory to the study of sentence organization, 
claiming that sentences revealed a basic oppositional structure in their 
conceptual form. At about the same time, a few other scholars started 
to look at text-construction through the theoretical lens of basic 
opposition theory. Mettinger (1994), for example, conducted an in-
depth empirical study of forty-three English-language novels, from 
which he isolated ten syntactic frames that he claimed were based on 
oppositional structure. He concluded that there were two kinds of 
conceptual oppositions, systematic and non-systematic, and that these 
played a crucial role in narratives. 
Within semiotics, the spread of Peircean (1931–1958) theory, 
which gained momentum in the late 1960s, led to a de-emphasis on 
the use of opposition theory to examine conceptual structure generally. 
However, the Peircean approach has in no way ever been conceived to 
be antithetical to structuralism, with various attempts having been put 
forward to reconcile markedness (a derivative of opposition theory) 
with iconicity theory (for example, Andersen 1989, 2001, 2008; Tomic 
1989). Also within the field, the analytical tradition of the Tartu School 
under the leadership of Juri Lotman (1991) never abandoned the basic 
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idea expressed by the Prague School linguists that oppositional 
structure may have been the conceptual glue, so to speak, that 
connected different codes to produce culture as an integrated sign-
based phenomenon (see Andrews 2003 and Lepik 2008). In the same 
way that biological codes are interconnected in the biosphere, so too 
cultural codes are interconnected in what Lotman called the semio-
sphere. The goal of semiotics and linguistics is, in this framework, to 
show how such interconnectedness unfolds in concrete ways through 
language, art, magic, ritual, etc.  
 
 
Types of opposition 
 
The Prague School linguists uncovered many different types and levels 
of opposition. They did this by means of a simple commutative 
method. For example, by commuting a specific sound in a word such 
as cat, changing it to rat or some other minimal form (bat, hat, etc.), 
one could establish the phonemic status of its constituent sounds — in 
this case initial /k/. A pair such as cat/rat was called a “minimal pair” 
by Trubetzkoy (1939). Using this simple technique, the Prague School 
linguists discovered many aspects of phonological structure. They 
found, for instance, that some phonemes occurred in many minimal 
pairs, while others did not. This came subsequently to be known as the 
“functional yield” of a phoneme. The phoneme /p/ in English has a 
high functional yield since it is distinctive in word-initial (pin/bin), 
word-internal (open/omen), and word-final (nap/nab) position, and 
can be found in opposition with virtually every other consonant 
phoneme of that language. Research also showed that oppositions 
often revealed what came to be called “symmetry” (Pos 1938; Jakobson 
1939; Trubetzkoy 1939; Martinet 1960). For example, the voiceless 
stops /p/-/t/-/k/ form the natural set of voiceless stops. Within that set, 
each phoneme can be put in binary opposition with the others: /p/-/t/ 
(pin/tin), /p/-/k/ (pin/kin/, etc. Similarly, /b/-/d/-/g/ forms the 
corresponding natural set of voiced stops, which has a similar “set-
internal” oppositional structure: /b/-/d/ (bin/din), /b/-/g/ (bet/get), etc. 
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Moreover, the consonants in the two sets can be put in opposition to 
each other: /p/-/b/ (pin/bin), /p/-/d/ (pen/den), etc. The opposition-
signaling feature between the two sets is, of course, [±voice]. This sug-
gested to the linguists that phonological systems possessed symmetry. 
However, they also discovered asymmetries or gaps in such systems — 
in English, there exists an opposition between the voiceless dental and 
palatal sibilants, /s/-/∫/ (sip/ship), but since there is no voiced palatal 
consonant in that language, then there is no corresponding 
oppositional partner to the voiced dental sibilant /z/ (as in zip). 
By conducting extensive analyses of this type, the Prague School 
linguists started to notice that there were specific articulatory triggers 
in phonemic contrasts. For example, in /m/-/p/ the opposition was 
triggered by a nasality/orality contrast, but in /m/-/n/ it was triggered 
instead by a bilabial/dental differentiation. These came to be called 
“distinctive features”. Thus, in the “cross-set” oppositions /p/-/t/-/k/ 
and /b/-/d/-/g/ the critical distinctive feature is, as mentioned, 
[±voice]. Within each set, other distinctive features marked the 
oppositions: for example, the feature that kept /p/ and /t/, as well as /b/ 
and /d/ distinct, was [±labial]. Distinctive feature analysis became a 
mainstay early on and was adopted a little later by generative 
linguistics, under the influence of Jakobson (Jakobson et al. 1952; 
Jakobson, Halle 1956; Jakobson 1968). It continues to be used to this 
day under the rubric of Optimality Theory (McCarthy 2001). Distinc-
tive features were differentiated from redundant features, such as the 
aspirated [ph] in English, which occurs in word-initial position only 
before a vowel: pat, pot, pill, pin, etc. If /s/ is put before the consonant, 
the aspiration is blocked: spit, spill, spunk, spat. Aspiration of /p/ is 
thus a predictable feature of English phonology — when /p/ occurs in 
word-initial position followed by a vowel it is aspirated. It is a redun-
dant, not a distinctive, feature. Since the two phones, [p] and [ph] are 
connected to each other in the way just described, they are said to be 
allophones that complement each other — where one occurs the other 
does not. The rule that specifies the way in which allophones 
complement each other came to be called a rule of complementary 
distribution.  
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Work on distinctive features led to a typology of oppositions 
(Trubetzkoy 1939). The main ones are worth repeating here: 
 
• A multidimensional opposition is one in which the distinctive features 
that are common to both phonemes also occur in other phonemes: for 
example, /p/ /t/, and /k/ share the features [+stop] and [-voice]; but they 
also share [+stop] with the [+voice] counterparts /b/, /d/, and /g/. 
 
• A one-dimensional or bilateral opposition is one in which the features 
common to both phonemes do not occur in other phonemes. 
 
• An isolated opposition is one that occurs between two specific 
phonemes but nowhere else in the phonemic system. 
 
• A proportional opposition is one that is found in two phonemes and is 
repeated in other phoneme pairs: for example, /d/-/t/, /b/-/p/ = 
[+voice]/[-voice]. 
 
• A privative opposition is one in which pairs are distinguished by only 
one feature: for example, /p/-/b/ = [±voice]. 
• A gradual opposition is one that involves varying degrees of a feature: 
for example the [open] feature of vowels. 
 
• An equipollent opposition in which pairs are distinguished by several 
features, /b/-/∂/ and /v/-/g/ are distinguished by [±labial] and [±stop] 
 
Sometimes, two sounds can be shown to have phonemic status in 
certain minimal pairs, but not in others. In English, for example, the 
vowels /i/ and /ε/ are phonemic, as can be seen in minimal pairs such 
as beet/bet. However, some speakers pronounce the word economics 
with an initial [i], others with an initial [ε]. When this occurs, the two 
sounds were said to be in free variation, a phenomenon that is seen as 
having an “outside” or “extralinguistic” effect on the phonemic system. 
The actual pronunciation of a phoneme can, of course, also vary from 
speaker to speaker, which may be due to geographic, social, or other 
extralinguistic factors. All this suggested to the Prague School linguists, 
before the crystallization of sociolinguistics as a branch of general 
linguistics, that it may be possible to set up socially-variable opposi-
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tions. For example, an opposition such as formal/informal might 
manifest itself as a difference in pronunciation, vocabulary, or some 
other linguistic phenomenon. 
As work in structuralism gained momentum in the 1940s and early 
1950s, inevitably the question arose as to the psychological validity of 
opposition. As interesting as it was, did it really explain linguistic 
competence or the language faculty, or was it no more than an artifact 
of the fertile minds of the Prague School linguists themselves? It was 
Jakobson (1942) who first tackled this question head on. By studying 
child linguistic development, he noted, for instance, that phonemic 
oppositions that occur rarely are among the last ones learned by 
children. Nasal phonemes exist in all languages. And, thus, they are 
among the earliest phonemes acquired by children. On the other hand, 
laryngeals are relatively rare and, consequently, are among the last 
phonemes to be acquired by children. Jakobson found many other 
features of linguistic development that fit in perfectly with the theory 
of opposition (Jakobson; Waugh 1979). In effect, as Jakobson’s work 
showed, the Prague School was starting to entertain broader 
implications of opposition theory before structuralism was margina-
lized by the various movements and forces mentioned above. 
Certainly, one of the questions that opposition theory begs is its 
extension beyond form to content. For the sake of convenience, 
therefore, oppositions can be divided into form-based and conceptual. 
Phonemic oppositions are form-based ones, since they allow us to 
recognize physical cues in words that are distinctive. Conceptual 
oppositions, on the other hand, involve content or meaning distinc-
tions. Oppositions such as day/night and right/left are conceptual. The 
method for determining them does not involve the commutation 
techniques used in phonemic analysis, but rather the more general 
notions of antonymy, contrast, and contrariness (Mettinger 1994). 
Early on, it was thought that the same kind of distinctive-feature 
analysis used in form-based methodology could be extended to iden-
tify conceptual oppositions. Pairs such as father/mother, son/daughter, 
for example, could be shown to be conceptually distinct in terms of 
features such as [±human], [±gender], [±adulthood], etc. These came 
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to be known generally as semes (Hjelmslev 1959; Coseriu 1973; Pottier 
1974), which could then be subdivided into classemes (subcategories). 
Although this seemed to constitute a useful way of establishing the 
denotative meanings of lexical items, it often produced strange or 
unrealistic results. An opposition between heifer and dog (female), for 
example, can be given as either [+bovine]/[-bovine] or [-canine]/ 
[+canine]. There really is no way to establish which one is, con-
ceptually, the actual trigger in the opposition. Moreover, when certain 
words are defined in terms of semes or classemes, it becomes obvious 
that to keep them distinct one will need quite a vast array of semes 
(Schooneveld 1978). The whole exercise could thus become con-
voluted, artificial, and self-referential. Moreover, in reality conceptual 
features are often sensitive to sociocultural meanings. Although the 
term bitch does exist in English to refer denotatively to a female dog, it 
is rarely if ever used any longer because of the social connotations it 
has taken on. It is obvious that the larger “meaning picture” is critical 
in expanding and refining opposition theory. Semes can, of course, be 
used practically to categorize lexemes into semantic fields. For 
example, items marked by the feature [+seat], such as chair, sofa, desk, 
bench, can be assigned to the same semantic field. Within that field 
they can be further distinguished from one another according to how 
many people are accommodated, whether a back support is included, 
what relative size each one is, and so on. Research on identifying a 
universal set of such features is ongoing, but it has yet to yield a set of 
features that is not ultimately self-referential (see, for instance, the 
insightful work of Wierzbicka 1996, 1997, 1999, 2003). Unlike 
phonological systems, which are closed form-based systems, semantic 
systems are open-ended conceptual systems and, thus, constantly 
changing to meet new social needs. 
The Prague School linguists and early Gestalt psychologists them-
selves realized that conceptual oppositions presented many technical 
and theoretical problems. Abstract concepts, such as “fatherhood,” 
“femininity,” “hope,” and “justice,” for instance, are particularly high 
in connotative content, and although they can be put on a binary 
scale — fatherhood/motherhood, femininity/masculinity, etc. — that 
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very scale is open to connotative gradience (Bolinger 1968). Among 
the first to examine connotative gradience in a systematic fashion were 
the psychologists Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum in 1957, who intro-
duced the concept of semantic differential to do so. They argued that 
connotative (culture-specific) meanings could be measured by using 
such polar concepts as young/old, good/bad, etc. and asking subjects to 
rate a concept on seven-point scales, with the polar concepts 
constituting the end-points of those scales. The ratings were then 
collected and analyzed statistically. The number seven was chosen, 
incidentally, because the year before George Miller (1956) had shown, 
in a study titled The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some 
Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information that the ability to 
process meaning cues or bits of information was limited to between 5 
and 9 equally-weighted errorless choices. To grasp how the semantic 
differential works, suppose hypothetically that subjects are asked to 
rate the concept “ideal father” in terms of oppositional scales such as 
practical/idealistic, flexible/stern, etc. The outcome would yield a 
connotative profile of “ideal fatherhood”. Results near the end of the 
scales (say, 1.4 or 6.4) would indicate high connotative content; results 
near the middle of the scales would indicate neutrality and, thus, 
equipollence in the oppositions. Research utilizing the semantic 
differential has shown that the range of variations is not a matter of 
pure subjectivity, but forms a socially-based pattern. Younger people 
may tend to rate the ideal father as being flexible, older ones as stern, 
and so on. In other words, the connotative indices of abstract concepts 
are constrained by psychological and cultural variables.  
Although very promising as a method for fleshing out social 
meanings, the semantic differential has never really caught on broadly. 
A common critique of the technique is that the poles used (practical/ 
idealistic, flexible/stern, etc.) are themselves artifacts, put there by the 
researchers to unconsciously guide subject choices along a certain path 
that is itself culture-specific. In other words they show what analysts 
want to show. But even if the scales are determined in advance, the 
results obtained may be unexpected ones and thus the whole tech-
nique would be legitimate as a form of randomized experimentation. 
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From the outset, the Prague School linguists realized that opposi-
tions were not limited to being necessarily binary. For example, the 
tense system of English has a basic ternary oppositional structure — 
present/past/future. It was found that oppositions can be strictly binary 
(right/left), ternary, four-part, graduated, or cohesive (set-based). The 
type of opposition that applies in the analysis of some system depends 
on what system (language, kinship, etc.) or subsystem (phonemic, 
semantic, etc.) is involved. Anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (1958), 
for example, showed that pairs of oppositions often cohered into sets 
forming recognizable units within specific cultural codes or systems. 
In analyzing kinship systems, Lévi-Strauss found that the elementary 
unit of kinship was made up of a set of four oppositions: brother/sister, 
husband/wife, father/son, and mother’s brother/sister’s son. A decade 
later, Algirdas J. Greimas (1966, 1970, 1987) introduced the notion of 
the “semiotic square” — a model of opposition involving two sets of 
concepts forming a square arrangement. Given a sign such as the 
adjective rich, Greimas claimed that we determine its overall meaning 
by opposing it not only to its contrary poor, as in binary oppositional 
analysis, but also to its contradictory not rich and to the contradictory 
of its contrary, not poor. This makes logical sense, of course, because 
one can be not poor and still not be rich. This type of analysis allows us 
to use contradictories such as white/non-white and link them to 
contrary terms such as white/black. And, as already discussed, by the 
1990s opposition theory was being revisited in the light of its previous 
applications to the study of conceptual systems, in line with the claims 
of early structuralists and especially the Copenhagen School of 
linguists, led by Hjelmslev (1939, 1959), who argued that oppositions 
existed as purely conceptual forms, underlying all languages indepen-
dently of how they were delivered (vocally, graphically, manually). In 
effect, language itself had an “evaluative superstructure”, as it came to 
be called more generally, that was oppositional in its overall makeup 
and design. 
It is beyond the purpose here to delve into the merits and 
weaknesses of notions such as n-ary opposition, the semiotic square, 
Copenhagen School linguistics, and other modifications to basic 
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opposition theory. Suffice it to say that the historical value of such 
debate lies in having shown that oppositional relations might involve 
various structures and modalities other than purely binary ones in the 
determination of distinctiveness, contrariness, and contradiction. Along 
with the semantic differential, opposition theory in general suggests that 
there may be levels and scales of opposition that determine how we 
extract meaning from concepts. Barthes (1967) too had argued that 
ternary and four-part oppositional structures surfaced frequently in 
specific codes. In the fashion code, for instance, these included tight 
fitting/closely-fit/loose/puffed-out for what he called d’adjustement, and 
open/side-by-side/closed/crossed/rolled-up, for clôture. Structuralist 
approaches to advertising theory (Nöth 1987, 1997; Danesi 2006) have 
also shown that advertising textualities are based on underlying 
oppositions that reach deeply into the mythic unconscious.  
Several questions remain that a revised and extended approach to 
opposition theory must attempt to address. First, what is the relation 
between form-based and conceptual oppositions? Are all concepts 
either polar — that is, forming a binary (right/left, day/night, etc.), 
ternary (present/past/future), etc. opposition — and others gradient, 
falling in between the polar concepts? The topic of further research in 
this domain will be taken up below. 
 
 
Markedness 
 
Early work revealed that many polar concepts seem to be formed on 
the basis of an overriding meta-opposition: presence/absence. In 
day/night for instance, night is typically conceived by people as being 
“absence of daylight”, while day is never conceived analogously as 
being “absence of night time”. So, it became obvious that polar 
concepts related to each other in terms of a “markedness” relation — 
night is marked with respect to day, which is perceived to be the 
“default” or “present” concept in the opposition. An opposition may, 
however, be equipollent if no markedness relation can be established 
or if there is a syncretism of two oppositions. For example, in the 
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give/accept opposition, either pole could be assigned “default” 
(unmarked) status, depending on the situation or viewpoint of the 
users of the opposition. So, sometimes other criteria must be enlisted 
to determine markedness relations, such as frequency. In language, the 
marked pole is generally more constrained than the unmarked pole in 
the type and number of combinations it may enter into, in the type 
and range of form changes it may undergo, in the frequency with 
which it occurs, and so on (Tiersma 1982; Eckman et al. 1983). This is 
perhaps why Trubetzkoy (1975: 362) defined markedness as the 
asymmetrical relation whereby one pole is more constrained than the 
other pole on a particular level (see also Chomsky, Halle 1968; Hertz 
1973; Jakobson and Waugh 1979; Waugh 1979, 1982). As Battistella 
(1990: 2) observes, the principle of markedness comes from the fact 
that “the terms of polar oppositions at any level of language are not 
mere opposites, but rather that they show an evaluative non-
equivalence that is imposed on all oppositions”.  
Psychologically, markedness has many profound implications. 
Above all else, it constitutes an unconscious conceptual reflex that 
subsequently guides language form and use. For example, when an 
opposition such as tall/short is involved in a speech situation, we ask 
instinctively “How tall are you?” not “How short are you?” because, 
unless there is a specific reason to do otherwise, we assume tallness to 
be the default pole, called the unmarked one, while the other pole, 
being exceptional or constrained, is the marked one. 
Markedness theory was applied to both form-based and conceptual 
oppositions and found to undergird the whole structure of language. 
For example, in the indefinite article system of English grammar, /a/ is 
the unmarked morph, since it occurs before all consonants in the 
chain of speech (a boy), while /æn/ is the marked one, because it 
occurs before vowels (an apple). The markedness criterion in this case 
is frequency, since there are more words beginning with consonants 
than vowels. However, frequency does not always play in role in 
assigning markedness status. For example, grape is less marked than 
grapes on the morphological level, since the singular form is typically 
the unmarked one on this level. However, on the semantic and dis-
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course levels the singular grape is the marked one since the plural form 
grapes is referentially more common and thus unmarked. Early 
markedness theory seemed, from the outset, to provide truly profound 
insights into the interconnectedness of linguistic levels and their 
relation to the external world of reference and reality, including social 
structure. In Italian, for example, the masculine plural form of nouns 
referring to people is the unmarked one, referring (nonspecifically) to 
any person, male or female, whereas the feminine plural form is 
marked, referring only to females. For instance, i bambini (which is 
masculine in form) can refer to all children, whereas le bambine refers 
specifically to female children. The fact that the unmarked form in 
Italian is the masculine gender is a cue that Italian society is 
historically male-centered. Changes in the markedness in the morpho-
logical system of Italian correspond to changes in social structure with 
regard to gender. 
Research has, in fact, shown that in societies (or communities) 
where the masculine gender is the unmarked form, it is the men who 
tend to be in charge, while in societies (or communities) where the 
feminine gender is the unmarked form, the women are the ones who 
are typically in charge. In other words, the markedness built into 
grammatical structure mirrors social structure (Alpher 1987; King 
1991). Markedness theory can thus be seen to be a diagnostic tool for 
unraveling unequal social relations and codes of power. Terms like 
chairman, spokesman, etc. are examples of how the English language 
predisposed its users to view certain social roles in gender terms in the 
recent past. Their replacements (chair, spokesperson, etc.) show how 
the oppositional poles in the evaluative superstructure of language can 
be neutralized. Indeed, markedness theory suggests that we can 
potentially change social structure by changing linguistic structure. 
Consider job designations as a case-in-point. Over the past sixty years, 
as women increasingly entered into traditionally male-based occu-
pations, their presence was perceived to be a deviation from tradition. 
Logically, their job titles were marked linguistically by adding suffixes 
such as -ess to words (waitress, actress, etc.). Elimination of this suffix 
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today is, in effect, a linguistic validation of women’s place in the 
professional workforce. 
Suffice it to say that markedness theory has had enormous impli-
cations not only for the study of linguistic structure, but also for the 
study of the interconnectedness between language, cognition, and 
culture. Obviously, the extension of markedness theory to other codes 
(music, gesture, mathematics, etc.) might reveal similarly interesting 
phenomena (see, for example, Andrews 1990; Schuster 2001; Hatten 
2004, Vijayakrishnan 2007; Danesi 2008). A fascinating study by van 
der Schoot, Bakker Arkema, Horsley and van Lieshout (2009), for 
instance, examined the effects of the opposition consistent/inconsistent 
within a relevant arithmetic operation and markedness (the relational 
term being unmarked [“more than”] vs. marked [“less than”]) on 
word problem solving in a sample of 10–12 year old children differing 
initially in problem-solving skill. The researchers found that less 
successful problem solvers will utilize a successful strategy only when 
the relational term is unmarked. In another significant study, Cho and 
Proctor (2007) found that when classifying numbers as odd or even 
with left-right keypresses, performance was better with the mapping 
even-right/odd-left than with the opposite mapping. Calling this a 
markedness association of response codes (MARC) effect, the authors 
attribute it to compatibility between the linguistic markedness of 
stimulus and response codes. The MARC effect and its reversal are 
caused by a correspondence of the stimulus code designated as 
positive by the task rule with the positive-polarity right response code. 
Markedness has also been found empirically to play a role in language 
learning and development generally (Collins 1969; Eckman et al. 1983; 
Park 2000; Mansouri 2000; Prieto 2005), discourse structure (Barba-
resi 1988), and in other areas of human cognitive, communicative and 
representational activity. Overall, the work on markedness in human 
conceptualization generally validates Jakobson’s initial findings, or at 
least their general implications — namely that opposition theory is a 
psychologically predictive and diagnostic tool.  
Opposition theory and the interconnectedness of language, culture, and cognition 27
Post-structuralism 
 
It is accurate to say that opposition theory, or at the very least its 
markedness subtheory, continues to have a role to play in investigating 
human codes and learning, even outside the purview of structuralism 
strictly defined. Its use in generative phonology, language acquisition 
studies, and mathematics, to mention a few areas, indicates that it 
continues to hold a strong intuitive appeal across disciplinary domains 
as a framework for understanding human cognition. However, as 
mentioned above, by the 1970s, work on opposition theory per se came 
to a virtual standstill, especially within semiotics, as so-called post-
structuralism took center stage. The post-structuralist stance was 
fashioned as a direct assault on markedness theory, presenting a clear 
challenge to the whole notion of opposition and thus structuralism.  
Spearheaded by the late Michel Foucault (1972) and especially 
Jacques Derrida (1967), the post-structuralist movement gained a 
foothold in semiotics, cultural studies, and philosophy throughout the 
1970s and 1980s probably because the Zeitgeist was ripe for such a 
movement, because notions such as authorship, narrative, inter-
pretation, and the like were starting to become problematic ones in 
these fields (see Belsey 2002 and Mitchell and Davidson 2007 for in-
depth analyses of post-structuralism). Post-structuralists were mainly 
literature scholars or culture analysts who had a particular social or 
ideological agenda in mind. As such, they attacked the very tool that 
allowed them to flesh out problems in social systems in the first 
place — opposition/markedness theory. In other words, they some-
how failed to see this very theory as a tool for diagnosing social 
inequalities. On the contrary, they saw it as underlying and validating 
them. Marginalized groups thus saw the attack against structuralism as 
an opportunity for overall vindication. But it is becoming more and 
more apparent that post-structuralism resulted from a fundamental 
misinterpretation of opposition/markedness theory. Foucault and 
Derrida not only did not realize that the theory had a diagnostic value, 
but actually saw it as a form of political discourse aiming to enshrine 
inequalities such as self/other. Derrida in particular argued that it was a 
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logocentric theoretical concoction, which itself rendered it useless, 
since it encoded “ideologies”, not “realities.” In some ways, Derrida 
had made a valid point. In pairs such day/night it is easy to accept day 
as the unmarked form and night as its marked counterpart. This does 
not mean that one is more basic than the other in any absolute sense, 
but rather that it is perceived to be that way for a historical or 
psychological reason. Problems emerge, however, with oppositions 
such as male/female and self/other. But the post-structuralists missed 
an underlying principle, discussed above in this paper — namely, in 
such cases, the choice of one or the other as the unmarked polar 
concept would clearly reflect a cultural (not an absolute) markedness. 
As mentioned, in patrilineal societies the unmarked form is likely to 
be male; but in matrilineal ones, as for example the Iroquois one 
(Alpher 1987), the unmarked is just as likely to be female. This fact 
was either unknown to the post-structuralists or conveniently ignored. 
Derrida (1977: 237) went so far as to claim that our oppositions 
deconstruct themselves when analyzed reflectively, that is, they fall 
apart, revealing their idealized origins: 
 
In idealization, to an origin or to a “priority” seen as simple, intact, 
normal, pure, standard, self-identical, in order then to conceive of deri-
vation, complication, deterioration, accident, etc. All metaphysicians 
have proceeded thus: good before evil, the positive before the negative, 
the simple before the complex, the essential before the accidental, the 
imitated before the imitation, etc. This is not just one metaphysical 
gesture among others; it is the metaphysical exigency. 
 
This passage reads more like a diatribe against a certain tradition, than 
a true rejection of opposition theory, since it uses that very theory to 
construct the diatribe. And, needless to say, Derrida failed to see that 
oppositions can be, and often are, reversed. This has happened, for 
example, to the young/old opposition in western society. At the turn of 
the twentieth century, old was seen as the unmarked form in terms of 
social status. By the 1920s a marketplace youth culture emerged to 
make young the unmarked one. Today, being young and staying 
young for longer and longer periods is the accepted norm (Danesi 
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2002). Such reversals exist across the domain of conceptual 
oppositions. They certainly do deconstruct themselves, as Derrida 
claimed, but in so doing they are reversing the markedness criteria or 
else neutralizing them. 
It is, of course, impossible to refute deconstruction theory on its 
own rhetorical terms. It is a classic example of post hoc propter hoc 
reasoning. And this might explain why it has started to show signs of 
decline and of waning. It is, and always has been, more of an “anti-
theory” than a paradigm shift within linguistics and semiotics. Now 
that the dust has settled in semiotics, it has become increasingly 
obvious that anti-theories have only temporary influence in scientific 
endeavors.  
 
 
Expanding the structuralist paradigm 
 
The analysis of the interconnections between linguistic oppositional 
structures and cultural-cognitive modalities was always implicit in the 
groundbreaking work of the Tartu School of semiotics (Lotman 1991; 
Andrews 2003; Lepik 2008). Lotman was among the first to envision 
culture as a system of interconnected codes shaped by historical 
processes. His approach to the language-culture-cognition nexus was 
broached in a general way by Danesi and Perron in 1999. However, 
they did not utilize the concept of opposition in their model of 
interconnectedness directly, although it was implicit in their use of 
image schemata theory (up/down, closed/open, etc.). The intercon-
nectedness approach can, in fact, be informed by the fact that oppo-
sitions are encoded in various cultural systems through a network of 
representational interconnections. As an example of how a single 
binary opposition might be so encoded, consider the right/left one 
(Needham 1973; Danesi 2007). This is derived, anatomically, from the 
fact that we have a left hand (and foot, leg, ear, and eye) and a right 
one. Now, this anatomical fact has been encoded in an opposition that 
carries a markedness criterion along with it — right is unmarked and 
left is marked. Here are a few of the ways in which this surfaces 
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culturally. First, it intersects with other oppositions — right is as-
sociated with good, light, etc. and left with evil, dark. This synchroni-
zation of oppositional poles can be shown as follows: 
 
right / left
b  b
good / evil
b  b
light / dark
b  b
day / night
b  b
etc.  etc.
 
This synchronization shows why we associate “leftness” with “evil” 
and both of these with “darkness”, and so on, and why, by contrast, we 
associate “rightness” with “goodness”, “light”, and so on. The as-
sociations are connotative, of course, and they are involved in gene-
rating rhetorical, aesthetic, and other textual structures. For example, 
in Michelangelo’s Last Judgment in the Sistine Chapel, Christ con-
demns sinners to Hell with his left hand but points good people to 
Heaven with his right hand. The word right is used commonly to 
convey concepts of “correctness”, “truth”, “justice”, in English and 
many other languages. In the United States, The Bill of Rights is a legal 
document that lays out the “rights” to which each person is entitled, 
and a “righteous” person is defined as someone moral, and thus 
without guilt or sin. English has adopted the Latin word sinister 
(“left”) to refer to something evil. Offering a handshake, saluting, or 
taking an oath with the left hand is considered improper and wrong. 
The list of the manifestations of the right/left oppositional network is a 
huge one. Similar networks can be established for other oppositions. 
Cumulatively these would show that our conceptual, representational, 
aesthetic, and ritualistic systems are interconnected in oppositional 
ways through connotative synchronizations of this type. 
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It is to be noted that in such a model of culture and cognition there 
is a fundamental positive/negative evaluation of various poles that 
establishes the markedness criteria throughout the network. In the 
above network the negative pole is the marked one and thus stands out 
cognitively and representationally. Also, the question of gradience can 
now be handled by locating gradient concepts in a similar synchro-
nous fashion. For example, in the network above, one could locate 
concepts such as benevolence, kindness, etc. as gradient ones on the 
good/evil polar scale and morning, noon, twilight, etc. as similarly 
gradient ones on the day/night scale, and so on. 
Now, the question of the etiology of such conceptual systems 
emerges. The plausible reason why we have come to assign positive 
values to the right end-point of the right/left scale and negative ones to 
the left pole probably stems from the fact that the majority of human 
beings use their right hands instinctively from birth to carry out 
routine tasks. Only about 10 percent of people are naturally left-
handed. As a consequence, the right hand is perceived to be the default 
form of human handedness. This type of reasoning suggests that 
markedness is hardly a phenomenon of Nature. Nature makes no 
social distinctions between right-handed and left-handed individuals, 
nor associates negative and positive values accordingly; people do. In a 
society where left-handedness is the norm (should there be one), then 
the marked pole would be right in the oppositional scale. As can be 
seen by examining the opposition sets above, determining which 
member of a pair is the unmarked form and which one the marked 
one is a matter of tradition and history, as Lotman had persuasively 
shown. Good, for example, has always been assumed to be the default 
form of human behavior in many societies, while evil has always been 
perceived to be its antagonistic counterpart. And, by and large, people 
living in communities aspire to conduct themselves for the betterment 
of the community, while a few do not. Narratives, paintings, and the 
like bring this out either directly or satirically (as the case may be).  
This type of analysis can be called “Systems Analysis” (SA), to 
adopt a term used by Sebeok and Danesi (2000) in reference to 
studying semiosis in terms of modeling systems theory. In the Sebeok-
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Danesi approach, SA entails looking at how models emerge and 
coalesce to produce semiosis in and across species. In the analysis of 
cultural networks of oppositions, the term SA can be used more 
specifically as a method for investigating the idea that models and the 
codes to which they belong have oppositional structure and that they 
are interconnected through synchronization.  
One of the tasks of SA would be to document and investigate how 
language and other codes mirror social and cultural processes. 
Another would be to determine which oppositions are more general or 
universal in the hierarchy of oppositions present in a network. Some 
seem to have universal status, including masculine/feminine, light/dark, 
good/evil, self/other, subject/object, sacred/profane, body/mind, nature/ 
culture, beginning/end, love/hate, pleasure/pain, existence/nothingness, 
left/right, something/nothing, among others. These can be called 
“meta-oppositions”, a term used already in this paper. Yet another 
main task of SA would be to determine which concepts are polar and 
which are gradient. Consider bodies of water. In English, words such 
as lakes, oceans, rivers, streams, seas, creeks, and so on are used 
commonly. These are gradient concepts located on a water/land 
oppositional scale. Now, people living in the desert have very few 
words for bodies of water, for obvious reasons. So, such concepts 
would not play as much of role in their culture as they do in others. In 
the latter, further oppositional refining, as it may be called, emerges. 
For example, size may enter the classificatory picture to produce 
lower-level conceptual oppositions — ocean/lake — as does width and 
length — river/stream — among other features. Another task of SA 
would be to investigate how a specific oppositional network manifests 
itself in representational, ritualistic, linguistic, aesthetic, and other 
cultural behaviors.  
One of the most important tasks of SA would be to apply opposition 
theory to the investigation of figurative meaning. As mentioned, the 
movement known as cognitive linguistics (CL) came to the forefront in 
the 1980s, after the publication of Lakoff and Johnson’s groundbreaking 
book, Metaphors We Live By (1980). Since then, the movement has 
become not only an alternative to generative linguistics and formal 
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semantics within linguistics proper, but also a highly valuable 
framework for semiotic, anthropological, and psychological analyses of 
the interconnectedness of language, cognition, and culture (Langacker 
1987, 1990, 1999; Gibbs 1994; Lakoff, Johnson 1999; Dirven and 
Verspoor 2004; Danesi 2004; Geeraerts 2006; Müller 2008). Without 
going into details here, suffice it to say that CL has documented the fact 
that cultural meaning emerges from associations among concepts, called 
conceptual metaphors or more generally blends (Fauconnier and Turner 
2002; Müller 2008). The idea behind the whole CL enterprise is that the 
human mind seeks to understand reality by blending domains of 
meaning through bodily, historical, and affective processes. For example, 
by linking animals to human personality, we are seeking to understand 
the latter in terms of the former. This is why we interpret sentences such 
as “He’s a fox”, “She’s an eagle”, and so on, as personality constructs. It 
is not the denotative meaning of the animals that is built into the 
sentences, but rather their connotative (cultural) meanings. Upon closer 
reflection, this whole process can be seen to be the consequence of an 
ontological opposition: humans/animals, with animals being the 
marked pole. This suggests that opposition operates in an ontological 
way to produce figurative meaning. Gradience in this case is the actual 
allocation of specific animals onto the scale — “John is a gorilla”, “Mary 
is a snail”, etc. 
Lakoff and Johnson trace the psychological source of such polarity 
and gradience to mental image schemata that are produced by our 
sensory experiences of locations, movements, shapes, substances, etc. 
as well as our experiences of social events and of cultural life in general 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987). Upon 
closer analysis, these turn out to be meta-oppositions: up/down, 
back/front, near/far, full/empty, balance/unbalance, etc. Their manifes-
tations occur in language (“I’m feeling up today”, “Inflation is going 
down at last”, “I’m full of memories”, “My sense of timing is out of 
synch”, etc.) and in other codes. For example, in music the up/down 
opposition is expressed by the fact that the higher tones express 
happiness and the lower ones sadness. This up is synchronized to 
happiness and down to sadness across the network of codes in a culture. 
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Consider again the opposition humans/animals discussed above. In 
western culture, it not only surfaces in discourse about human 
personality, but also in the naming of sports teams (Denver Broncos, 
Chicago Bears, Detroit Tigers, etc.), which imparts a certain character 
to the team in terms of perceived animal qualities, in the utilization of 
fictional or cartoon characters (Bugs Bunny, Daffy Duck, etc.) to 
represent human personality types, in assigning surnames and 
nicknames (John Fox, Mary Wolf, etc.), and so on and so forth. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The goal of SA is to investigate opposition theory as a framework for 
studying interconnectedness in cultural systems. Among the tasks and 
questions it will have to broach (some of which have already been 
mentioned), the following is only a minimal list: 
 
•  Which kinds of concepts are polar and which are gradient? It would 
seem that some emotion concepts (love/hate, happiness/sadness, etc.), 
metaphysical concepts (existence/nothingness, unity/multiplicity, etc.), 
mathematical concepts (even/odd, prime/composite, etc.), and various 
others surface as polar across cultures. Others seem to surface as 
gradient, occurring between poles in an opposition. This is the case for 
example of color concepts (red, blue, etc.) and temporal concepts (noon, 
afternoon, etc.), which are locatable between polar concepts such as 
light/dark, day/night, and so on. 
 
•  Which polar concepts are universal and which are not? It would 
seem that those that are purely binary (right/left) cut across cultures. 
However, this would have to be investigated and examined more 
empirically. 
•  How is markedness assigned in a polar opposition? What kind of 
criteria apply to the establishment of markedness? 
 
•  How many oppositions are n-ary in a culture? Within n-ary oppo-
sitions where do the gradient concepts occur? 
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•  What is the intrinsic relation between opposition theory and con-
ceptual blending?  
 
•  How does synchronization unfold in specific cultures? Are there any 
aspects of synchronization that are universal? 
 
•  To what extent are codes oppositional in structure and how is the 
evaluative superstructure of codes utilized to create texts of all kinds, 
from narratives to scientific theories? 
 
•  Is oppositional structure specific to human semiosis or does it cut 
across semiosis in all species? I would argue that it does not, while others 
may argue differently (Nöth 1994). Nevertheless, this is a key question 
for both semiotics proper and biosemiotics. 
 
These are of course only a handful of questions that can be asked 
within the framework of SA. As has been argued in this paper, the 
time has come to reactivate opposition theory research in a revitalized 
form of structuralism that can embrace current models of meaning 
coming out of CL and other domains (biosemiotics, mathematical 
philosophy, etc.). But perhaps the most fundamental question of all 
that such a revitalized structuralism begs is the following one. Since 
oppositional concepts have existed across time and across cultures to 
encode some of the most metaphysically important questions humans 
have devised, is oppositional structure in the world or in the mind? In 
other words, do we understand the world in oppositional terms 
because we ourselves are structured to do exactly that and, thus, are 
blocked from ever really understanding the true nature of reality? Or 
is the world itself oppositional in structure and all we are doing is 
discovering how this is so?  
In sum, as one of the most important achievements of the Prague 
School, opposition theory continues to have validity, despite counter-
movements that have emerged to either attack it or replace it with 
other models of meaning. It is one of those notions that has always 
been implicit in human affairs, but which needed articulation in a 
concrete scientific way. That articulation gave birth to structuralism 
which, itself, is a throwback of ancient philosophies that surfaced in 
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mythic, religious, and philosophical forms. As social critic Camille 
Paglia (1992: x) has so aptly put it, it reveals a basic truth about human 
experience: “All objects, all phases of culture are alive. They have 
voices. They speak of their history and interrelatedness. And they are 
all talking at once!” 
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Теория оппозиций и соотносимость языка, культуры и 
восприятия 
 
Теорию оппозиций всегда считали основой структурализма в совре-
менном языкознании и семиотике. Как аналитическая техника она 
до сих пор используется в них в качестве основного приема/ инстру-
мента для нахождения значимых частиц в физической форме знака. 
Но как теория понятийной структуры она была отвергнута под 
влиянием торжествующего с начала 1960-х гг. постструктурализма 
(единственным исключением тут является Тартуская школа). Статья 
рассматривает теорию оппозиций в качестве не только весьма 
эффективного средства при анализе понятийных структур, но и как 
великолепную технику для выявления связей между языком, культу-
рой и восприятием.  
 
 
Opositsiooniteooria ja keele, kultuuri ning taju seotus 
 
Opositsiooniteooriat on kaasaegses keeleteaduses ja semiootikas alati 
peetud strukturalismi alustalaks. Analüütilise tehnikana on opositsiooni-
teooria neil aladel jätkuvalt põhivahendite seas. Seda kasutatakse märkide 
füüsilises kujus tähenduslike vihjete leidmiseks. Kuid mõistelise struktuuri 
teooriana on see alates 1960ndatest võidukäiku teinud poststrukturalismi 
mõjul hüljatud — ainsaks erandiks siinkohal Tartu koolkonna semiootika. 
Käesolev artikkel käsitleb opositsiooniteooriat mitte ainult kui vägagi 
toimivat teooriat mõisteliste struktuuride analüüsimiseks, vaid ka kui 
suurepärast tehnikat keele, kultuuri ja taju omavahelise seotuse tõesta-
miseks. 
 
 
